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LIABILITY OF HUSBAND FOR TORTS OF HIS WIFE
The Supreme Court of Florida in Rogers v. Newby' recently held
that Section 708.08 of Florida Statutes 1949,2 which confers certain
rights upon a married woman with respect to her separate property,
does not relieve her husband of his common law liability for her
pure torts. The purpose of this Note is to examine this common law
rule in the light of married women's property acts, which remove
for the most part the common law disabilities of married women.
CoMMoN LAW

At common law a husband is liable jointly with his wife for torts
committed by her either during or before coverture. 3 His liability
for her torts committed during coverture is restricted to "pure"
torts, 4 that is, those not connected with a contract she has undertaken

141 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1949).
2
This provides:
"Every married woman is hereby empowered to take charge of, and manage
and control her separate property, to contract and to be contracted with, to sue
and be sued, and to sell . . . mortgage, use . . . her property, real and
personal, and to make, execute and deliver instruments . . . of every char-

acter . . .without the joinder or consent of her husband, in all respects as
fully as if she were unmarried. Every married woman, without the joinder or
consent of her husband, shall have ...all rights and powers with respect to
her separate property, income and earnings, and may enter into . . . and
enforce contracts . . . to the same extent . . . as if she were unmarried;

provided, however, that no instrument conveying or encumbering real property
. . . shall be valid without the joinder of her husband; . . . any claim or

judgment against any married woman shall not be a claim or lien against such
married woman's inchoate right of dower."
Miller v. Phillips, 157 Fla. 175, 25 So.2d 194 (1946), analyzes in searching
fashion the dubious import of this provision as regards conveyance of realty.
Additional rights have been granted to married women in Florida: FLA.
CONST. Art. 11, §1 (separate property not subject to husband's debts); FLA. STAT.
§708.02 (1949) (right to separate property), §708.06 (right to earnings), §708.09
(right to make contracts with husband).
33 HoLDSwORT-rl, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 531 (6th ed. 1934); 2 KENT,
Comm. 0149.
4
A pure tort is one

"...
not growing out of, or founded upon, or directly
connected with, or a part of, or the means of effecting, a contract ...." Prentiss
v. Paisley, 25 Fla. 927, 7 So. 56 (1890); Meeks v. Johnston, 85 Fla. 248, 251,
95 So. 670, 671 (1923). A pure tort has also been defined in Florida as an act of
commission, not omission. See Ballenger v. Mark, 115 Fla. 95, 111, 155 So. 106,
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to make. The reason for this limitation is that entertainment of actions
based on torts growing out of contracts would amount in practical
effect to indirect enforcement of contracts into which the wife is
under disability to enter; consequently at common law neither spouse
is liable.5 As an adjunct to his liability for her pure torts, the husband, upon a plea of coverture by his wife, is a necessary partydefendant in such an action against her.6 His liability ceases upon
dissolution of the marriage by divorce 7 or deaths of the wife prior
to judgment; and if he dies before judgment his estate is not liable. 9
He alone is liable for torts committed by her under his coercion;
and his mere presence during their commission raises a rebuttable
presumption of coercion.' °
This common law liability of the husband is of ancient origin,
and the authorities are in conflict as to the reason for its existence.
Some courts emphasize the common law fiction of unity of person,
which renders the wife a legal nonentity." On the other hand, it
has been said that the basis of the law of husband and wife is not
unity of person but the profitable relationship of guardian that the
husband enjoys over the person and property of his wife. 12 Other
courts draw no distinction between these two concepts but predicate
the liability on a combination of the two.' 3 Still others' 4 find the
reason to be the impossibility of an action being maintained against
112 (1934) (concurring opinion); Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 668, 140
So. 893, 901 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
5
E.g., Keen v. Hartman, 48 Pa. 497 (1865).
61 CFrTY, PLEADING *105.

7Cf. Cuenod v. Leslie [1909] 1 K.B. 880. See 3 HoLoswowrH, HsoRY OF
ENGLISH LAw 531 (6th ed. 1934).
8
Head v. Briscoe, 5 C. & P. 484, 172 Eng. Rep. 1064 (1833).
93 HormswoRm, HSTORY OF ENGLiSH LAw 531 (6th ed. 1934). Survival of
actions in Florida- today is analyzed in Note, 1 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 260 (1948).
104 BL. COMMr. *28.
ISee Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 672, 140 So. 893, 898 (1932);
Bryant v. Smith, 187 S.C. 453, 198 S.E. 20, 22 (1938). The concept of unity
may well stem from Genesis ii, 24, "...

and they shall be two in one flesh."

Cf. 4 Mm-m- L. Q. 358, 362 (1950).
121 POLLOCK AND MATLAND, HisoOy OF ENGLISH LAW 485 (2d ed. 1905).
13 Lane v. Bryant, 100 Ky. 138, 37 S.W. 584 (1896); see Martin v. Robson,

65 III. 129, 136, 16 Am. Rep. 578, 585 (1872); Claxton v. Pool, 197 S.W. 349,
352 (Mo. 1917); Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 Pac. 833, 836 (1896).

14 See Price v. Clapp, 119 Tenn. 425, 105 S.W. 864, 866 (1907); Prentiss v.
Paisley, 25 Fla. 927, 930, 7 So. 56 (1889), as qualified by the dictum in Meeks
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the wife without joinder of her husband.' 5
STATUTORY CHANGES

Statutes in more than half of the states' 6 and in England 17 have
expressly abrogated the common law rule, although usually they
continue the liability of the husband when he either participates
with his wife in the commission of the tort' 8 or would be jointly
responsible with her if the marriage did not exist.' 9
In the absence of statutes expressly limiting the liability of the
husband, some courts have considered what effect married women's
property acts have on the husband's liability. Typically, such statutes
grant a married woman the right to receive her earnings and to own
property free from the debts and liabilities of her husband. They

v. Johnston, 85 Fla. 248, 252, 95 So. 670, 671 (1928). But see Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 672, 140 So. 893, 898 (1932). This theory dates back
through a long line of cases to a statement in Drury v. Dennis, 1 Yelv. 106, 80
the husband shall be join'd in such case but
Eng. Rep. 72 (1608), that "...
for conformity."
15 For a complete discussion of the reasons for the rule see Campbell, Status
of Married Persons in Canada, 7 CAN. B. REv. 500 (1929).
6
1 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 34, §70 (1940); Airz. CODE ANN. §63-303 (193U);
CAL. Civ. CODE §171a (1940); ILL. STAT. ANN. C. 68, §4 (Smith-Hurd 1936);
IND. ANN. STAT. §38-105 (Burns 1949); IOwA CODE §597.19 (1946); Ky. REV.
STAT. §404.040 (1948) (liability limited to value of property received by virtue
of the marriage); ME. REv. STAT. c. 153, §38 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 45, §5 (1939); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 209, §6 (1933), Austin v. Cox, 188 Mass.
58 (1875); MicH. CogP. LAWS §14015 (1929); MINN. STAT. §519.05 (Henderson 1945); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §3680 (1939); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §36-109
(1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 37:2-8 (1940); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §57; N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-15 (1943); N.D. REV. CODE §14-0708 (1943); OMo GEN.
CODE ANN. §8002 (Page 1938); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §9(1) (1937); ORE.
CoMP. LAWS ANN §63-208 (1940); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 417, § §9, 12 (1938); S.D.
CODE §14.0206 (1939); TEx. STAT., REv. Civ. art. 4613 (1940); UTAH REV.
STAT. tit. 40, c. 2, §7 (1933); VT. STAT. §3169 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. §55-37
(1950); Perren v. Press, 196 Wash. 14, 81 P.2d 867 (1938); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§4750 (1943).
17The Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 25 & 26 GEO. V.,
c. 30 (1935). See Edwards v. Porter [19251 A.C. 1, which interpreted the English
married women's property act as not relieving the husband of liability.
18 E.g., Alabama, Maryland, Rhode Island, West Virginia; for citations see note
15 supra.
19 E.g., California, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri; for citations see note 15 supra.
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also grant her the right to manage her separate property, to contract,
and to sue and be sued as if she were a feme sole.2 0
A slight majority of those courts that have considered the question 2 ' apply the common law maxim that when the reason for a
rule fails the rule itself fails, and accordingly they hold that such
acts have removed the husband's liability for his wife's torts. The
difficulty with this solution is that application of the maxim requires
knowledge of the reason for the original establishment of the rule
of liability; and this, as we have already noted, is obscure and controversial. Most courts have overcome this difficulty by taking a
practical view and recognizing the broad changes, familiar to every
layman, that these acts have brought about in the common law
status of married women. 22 On the other hand, those courts that
narrowly construe the property acts and uphold the common law
rule have failed to agree on grounds for doing so. Some, like the
Florida Court, have recognized that the original reason for the rule
is uncertain but have nevertheless concluded that it has not failedwhatever it may be; 23 others have relied on the lack of express legislative intent to abolish the rule.24 Unrepealed statutes recognizing
20

E.g., S.C. CODE AwN. §§400, 8572-8575 (1942); see note 2 supra.
Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 138 Pac. 1053 (1914); Bourland v.
Baker, 141 Ark. 280, 216 S.W. 707 (1919); Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94
Pac. 360 (1908); Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782, 142 S.E. 111 (1928); Martin
v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129, 16 Am. Rep. 578 (1872); Norris v. Corkill, 32 Kan. 409,
4 Pac. 862 (1884); Lane v. Bryant, 100 Ky. 138, 37 S.W. 584 (1896); Claxton v.
Pool, 197 S.W. 349 (Mo. 1917); Goken v. Dallugge, 72 Neb. 16, 99 N.W. 818
(1904); Harris v. Webster, 58 N.H. 481 (1878); Custine v. Westenberger, 224
Pa. St. 455, 73 Ad. 913 (1908); see Bryant v. Smith, 187 S.C. 453, 198 S.E. 20,
22 (1938); Wolf v. Keagy, 33 Del. 362, 136 At. 520, 525 (1927); cf. Culmer v.
Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 Pac. 833 (1896). Contra: Henley v. Wilson, 137 Cal.
273, 70 Pac. 21 (1902); Choen v. Porter, 66 Ind. 194 (1879); McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa 224 (1873); Ferguson v. Brooks, 67 Me. 251 (1877); Morgan
v. Kennedy, 62 Minn. 348, 64 N.W. 912 (1895); Sargeant v. Fedor, 3 N.J. Misc.
832, 130 Ad. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Fitzgerald v. Quann, 109 N.Y. 441, 17 N.E.
354 (1888); Young v. Newsome, 180 N.C. 315, 104 S.E. 660 (1920); Fowler v.
Chichester, 26 Ohio St. 9 (1874); Zeliff v. Jennings, 61 Tex. 458 (1884); see
Kellar v. James, 63 W. Va. 139, 59 S.E. 939, 940 (1907).
22
See, e.g., Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 360, 362 (1908); Martin
65 Ill. 129, 131, 16 Am. Rep. 578, 580 (1872).
v. Robson,
23
Rogers v. Newby, 41 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1949); cf. Henley v. Wilson, 137 Cal.
273,2470 Pac. 21 (1902); Zeliff v. Jennings, 61 Tex. 458 (1884).
See, e.g., McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa 224, 227 (1873); Fowler v.
Chichester, 26 Ohio St. 9, 14 (1874).
21
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it have prevented still other courts from abolishing it.25 It is highly
significant, however, that with the sole exception of Florida all jurisdictions that once narrowly construed the property acts2 now have
express statutes overruling these judicial interpretations. 6
In the Rogers case 27 our Supreme Court refused to relieve the
husband of liability for the pure torts of his wife in spite of our
28
statute emancipating her in the handling of her property. In an
early case the Court had predicated the liability of the husband on
the impossibility of suing the wife alone.2 9 More recently it had
stated that the husband is no longer a necessary party defendant in
a tort action against his wife; 30 and this suggests that the reason for
the husband's liability has indeed been removed. Counsel in the
subsequent Rogers case contended that the reason for the rule no
longer exists because of the statutory provision enabling a married
woman to sue and be sued ". . . without the joinder.., of her husband,
31
in all respects as fully as if she were unmarried." The Court rejected
this argument, however, by confining the scope of the provision to
actions involving the wife's separate property. Once again the common
husband is still
law rule is operative, and it follows logically that the
32
a necessary party to a tort action against his wife.
The Court further pointed out that the reason for the rule of
liability is not clear, and alluded to what it deemed the failure of
the Legislature to emancipate the wife from her common law status
to an extent sufficient to relieve her husband of liability for her torts.
The opinion suggests that the underlying basis of the decision is
this: Inasmuch as a married woman still lacks, in many instances,
adequate pecuniary responsibility under present socio-economic con-

25

Young v. Newsome, 180 N.C. 815, 104 S.E. 660 (1920); see Morgan v.
62 Minn. 348, 852, 64 N.W. 912, 913 (1895).
Kennedy,
26
See note 16 supra.
27

Rogers v. Newby, 41 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1949).

2 8

§708.08 (1949); cf. note 2 supra.
See Prentiss v. Paisley, 25 Fla. 927, 929, 7 So. 56 (1889). Contrary to what
is said in Rogers v. Newby, this statement of the reason was not qualified until
Meeks v. Johnston, 85 Fla. 248, 252, 95 So. 670, 671 (1923); see note 14 supra.
30
See Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 200, 20 So.2d 243, 244 (1944).
31
See note 2 supra.
32
It is realized that the Court might perhaps distinguish a procedural necessity
FLA. STAT.
29

for joinder from the substantive rule of liability and might permit action against
the wife without joinder of her husband.
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ditions, the liability of her husband in tort actions should continue.
Since the enactment of statutes relating to married women's property, some jurisdictions have drawn a distinction between torts
committed by a married woman in the use and management of her
separate property and those not involving this separate property. 33
For the most part the husband has been relieved of liability for
torts of the wife involving her separate property, but in some instances his liability for her other torts has been expressly reaffirmed. 34
The theory is that, inasmuch as he no longer has the right to manage
unjust to hold him liable for its imher property, it is manifestly
35
management.
proper
The Florida Supreme Court has not expressed an opinion on this
differentiation. In Greene v. Miller,38 which, however, was decided
well before the enactment of the statute enabling the wife to manage
her separate property,37 the husband was held liable jointly with his
wife for a tort involving her separate property.38 The tort was not
personally committed by the wife, but the negligence of a third
person in operating the wife's automobile was imputed to her by
applying the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.3 9 The Court labeled
3

Wolf v. Keagy, 88 Del. 862, 186 Atl. 520 (1927); Boutell v. Shellaberger,
264 Mo. 70, 174 S.W. 884 (1915); Quilty v. Battie, 185 N.Y. 201, 82 N.E. 47
(1892); Harrington v. Jagmetty, 88 N.J.L. 548, 88 AUt. 880 (1912); Foster v.
Ingle, 147 Tenn. 217, 246 S.W. 580 (1922); Leros v. Parker, 79 W. Va. 700, 91
S.E. 660 (1917); Christensen v. McCann, 41 Wyo. 167, 282 Pac. 1061 (1929).
34
E.g., Quilty v. Battie, Foster v. Ingle, supra note 88.
35
"Since the husband is left no legal right to intermeddle with the business
affairs and property of the wife, it is not logical to admit him to her new sphere
solely that he may pay damages for torts the wife commits therein, excluding him
for all other purposes," Boutell v. Shellaberger, 264 Mo. 70, 174 S.W. 884, 886
(1915).
Fla. 767, 186 So. 582 (1981).
36102
37
See note 2 supra.
38
n Florida a judgment recovered, in a tort action against a married woman
may be satisfied from her separate property. See Stanley v. Powers, 128 Fla. 859,
862, 864, 166 So. 848, 845 (1936); cf. MeGill v. Cockrell, 81 Fla. 468, 88 So. 268
(1921); Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla. 805, 19 So.2d 876 (1944).
391 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 286 (1948). See also Potter v. Florida Motor Lines,
57 F.2d 818 (S.D. Fla. 1982), in which it was held that a married woman was
not contributorily negligent so as to bar her claim because her inability to contract
prevented the negligence of a third person from being imputed to her through
the doctrine of joint enterprise. Since married women may now contract, presumably liability can be imputed to them through application of this doctrine, and
i
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this a pure tort 40 and placed it within the ambit of the common law
rule. Imposing liability on the husband for torts that his wife does
not personally commit is obviously a broad extension of the common
law rule.
Now that a married woman may enter into contracts of agency,
the question arises whether the husband's liability will be similarly
extended to include torts committed by her agents for which she
41
is liable only vicariously. Since at common law a married woman
is under disability to enter into contracts of agency, neither she nor
42
her husband is liable for torts committed by her agents. No jurisdiction, however, has considered whether the modem capacity of a
married woman to bind herself by contract is fatal to the common
43
law restriction of the husband's liability to her pure torts. Inasmuch
44
as this restriction arose from a logical necessity no longer existent,
it can at least be argued that the husband is liable even for torts
arising out of his wife's contracts. This mechanical expansion of the
common law concept is nevertheless unsound; since she can now
enter into contracts on her own, she alone should be liable for her
acts in connection therewith.
the question arises whether the husband is now liable for torts imputed to her
through this contractural relationship.
4OThis is the logical terminology, since the tort involved no element of contract, although some courts have said that no tort involving separate property can
be a pure tort, regardless of whether it is connected with a contract, Quilty v.
Battie, 185 N.Y. 201, 32 N.E. 47 (1892); Boutell v. Shellaberger, 264 Mo. 70,
174 S.W. 384 (1915).
41
Even before the passage of FLA. STAT. §708.08 (1949) the Court interpreted
FLA. STAT. §708.06 (1949), giving married women the right to their earnings, as
according them by implication the right to hire agents, Banfield v. Addington,
104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932).
42Cf. Ferguson v. Neilson, 17 R.I. 81, 20 At. 229 (1890).
43
1n Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932), a married
woman was held liable for a tort, committed by her agent, which grew out of an
invalid contract between her and the plaintiff, but the Court said, "It seems plain,
therefore that . . . an undertaking, contractual or otherwise . . . does not make
the cause of action sued on . . . a matter arising out of or connected with a
contract in a legal sense, such as would relieve a married women from liability
by reason thereof under the rule in the Florida cases first cited." The rule referred
to is that restricting a married woman's liability to pure torts. While the husband
was made a defendant in the action, the question of his liability was not passed
on. See also Ballenger v. Mark, 115 Fla. 95, 155 So. 106 (1934), and Doyle v.
Gables, 159 Fla. 802, 33 So.2d 41 (1947).
Coral
44
See note 5 supra.
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CON&LUSION

In virtually all jurisdictions the husband is no longer liable for
any torts committed by his wife4 5 other than those in which he participates while married or for which he would be liable regardless
of the marriage relationship. In two states the husband is not liable
for torts committed by his wife in the use of her separate property 6
but apparently remains liable for her other torts. In only one state
specifically reother than Florida has the judiciary in recent years
47
affirmed the common law rule in its full force.
Whether a husband is liable in Florida for torts committed by his
wife in the use of her separate property, and whether he is legally
responsible for liability incurred vicariously by her, are open questions today. But there is no reason whatever for assuming that the
Legislature, in granting married women new freedom to engage in
business activities, intended actually to increase the sphere of her
husband's responsibility for her conduct. It is certain that his common law liability for her pure torts committed during coverture
continues; and presumably he is liable for torts committed by her
48
before marriage.
Today the unfortunate husband in Florida, although stripped 6f
common law control and benefits, nevertheless continues to be an
insurer of his wife's conduct; he is placed in a position almost without
parallel in that he must respond in damages for her misconduct
without having a corresponding power to prevent it. Oddly enough,
the common law did not impose this liability upon the father for
the torts of his children 49-a liability that even now could be far
more readily justified-but the liability as husband is perpetuated
here. Its origin is not definitely known; but in any event its feudal
setting has prompted practically all other jurisdictions to awake to
thee obvious fact that in modem times married women are largely
the equals of their husbands before the law. This rule has outlived
45No case or statute eliminating the husband's common law liability for pure
torts was found in the following states: Connecticut, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada,
Tennessee, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
40
Foster v. Ingle, 147 Tenn. 217, 246 S.W. 530 (1922); Christensen v. McCann,
41 Wyo. 167, 282 Pac. 1061 (1929).
47
See McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 204 P.2d 990, 999, 1007 (1949).
48
See note 3 supra.
49
Dempsey v. Frazier, 119 Miss. 1, 80 So. 341 (1918).
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